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Abstract
Models with imperfect competition and intra-industry trade have become
widely accepted as appropriate frameworks within which to analyze the impact
of trade liberalization on industrial agglomeration. This paper makes one
modi…cation to the standard model; it allows for taxation of internationally
mobile capital. Making this change fundamentally alters the main lesson from
the tax literature that a country which faces perfectly internationally mobile
capital should not use source-based taxes on capital income. In particular, it
is shown that a country which hosts an agglomeration may actually increase
its welfare level per capita by levying a source-tax on capital income even if
capital can move costlessly between countries. It is thereby able to exploit
the locational inertia created by agglomeration forces.
¤The authors wish to thank Victor D. Norman, Linda Orvedal, and Diego Puga for valuable
comments. This research has been …nanced by the Norwegian Shipowners Association.
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1 Introduction
A main lesson from the literature on capital taxation in an open economy is that in a
situation with internationally mobile capital a country should not use source-based
taxes on capital income. This result is valid if labor is in …xed supply and there are no
pure pro…ts (e.g. Gordon, 1986, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka, 1991, and Bucovetsky and
Wilson, 1991). The reason is that internationally mobile capital escapes any burden
of taxation if foreign-source income cannot be taxed for compliance reasons.1 Yet, in
a world where economic activity is not evenly spread out across space but ”lumped”
into industrial agglomerations, tax policies developed for a smooth world might need
rethinking. In this paper we argue that in the presence of agglomerations, one of the
assumptions underlying the well known result of zero source tax on capital income,
no longer holds. We show that even though capital is perfectly internationally
mobile, it need not necessarily be perfectly elastic in supply, in which case the zero
source tax does not remain an optimal policy. It is shown that through a positive
source tax a government may be able to exploit the locational inertia created by
agglomeration forces. Thus, a country that hosts an industrial cluster can, in fact,
increase national welfare by levying a source tax on capital income.
To bring forward the implications of industrial agglomeration for the design of
optimal tax policy, we set up a simple model that follows the line of work that
is usually referred to as the ”new economic geography”. The model is based on
an interaction between economies of scale, market size, positive market linkages,
trade costs, and national tax policies. It allows for analysis not only of how the
presence of industrial agglomerations may a¤ect optimal tax policy, but also of
the impact of capital taxation on the localisation of industries and clusters. A
further di¤erence between this paper and the previous tax literature is the realistic
interaction between trade and capital mobility, which is modelled within a two
country - two industry - setting. The literature on tax policy and capital mobility
1If labor supply is variable and agents di¤er in their shares of capital and labor income, it is
optimal to levy a source based tax on capital as well as a tax on labor income (Bjerksund and
Schjelderup, 1998). The reason is that the incidence of the wage tax is partly shifted to capital
owners.
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has hitherto completely ignored the interaction of capital taxation, markets size and
trade costs as parameters that may in‡uence the optimal design of capital taxation.2
Yet there is mounting empirical evidence that these parameters play a major part
in …rms’ investment decisions. Cantwell (1994) and Deveraux and Gri¢th (1996),
for example, demonstrate that market size is one of the main determinants for
foreign direct investments, while Hartman (1985) and Slemrod (1990) …nd that there
is a statistically signi…cant and positive relationship between market size and the
e¤ective marginal tax on capital. In addition, there is amble evidence that politicians
give concessions to industrial clusters out of fear for that these concentrations will
otherwise vanish.3
The chosen framework allows us to examine what will happen to the relative
competitiveness of an industry in the two countries (for a given level of trade costs)
and thus to production and trade, if we introduce changes in capital taxation. We
elaborate on the persistence of industry structures and trade patterns when taxes
on capital are allowed to di¤er between countries. In addition, by changing the
level of trade costs we investigate the interaction between capital taxation and the
degree of economic integration. The rapid integration of western economies and, in
particular, the creation of the internal market of the European Union (EU) is hoped
to improve e¢ciency and welfare.
Politicians and economists still worry about some possibly less desirable conse-
quences of tighter economic integration. Trade economists typically fear that tighter
economic integration may increase concentration tendencies and reduce the compet-
itiveness of industry located at the periphery thereby possibly lowering income and
welfare in rural areas (e.g. Krugman and Venables, 1990, 1995 and Krugman, 1991).
In the public …nance literature the debate has been over economic consequences of
di¤erences in Europe’s …scal systems. The removal of trade barriers may exacer-
bate distortions from non-harmonized national tax systems and lead to capital ‡ight
2One exception is Hau‡er and Wooton (1997). In their study market size is the sole determinant
for location decisions.
3The shipping industry, for example, is facing close to zero rates of e¤ective taxation for exactly
these reasons (OECD 1997).
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to low-tax countries as well as changes in the patterns of international trade (e.g.
Sinn, 1990). Although both the trade and the public …nance literature have been
concerned with the e¤ects of economic integration, very little work has been under-
taken to combine the two strands of the literature, and is as such also a scope of the
present analysis.4
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our basic model.
Section 3 examines on the one hand how tax policy design is a¤ected by the pres-
ence of agglomerations, and on the other hand how changes in national tax policy
and capital mobility a¤ect localization decisions. Section 4 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
There are two countries, called country h (home) and f (foreign). Each country
may contain two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. Country i is endowed with
Li units of labor and Ki units of capital. We denote wi as the wage rate, and ri
as the rental rate of capital. Factor intensities di¤er between sectors but not across
countries, and the agricultural sector is assumed relatively intensive in the use of
labor. Labor is immobile between countries while capital is assumed internationally
mobile. Each country may levy taxes on wage and capital income, but since a tax
on labor income within this setting is lump sum in nature, it will not be subject to
discussion: The representative resident in country i receives income from labor and
capital and has preferences over agriculture and manufacturing given by the utility
function U = C1¡°A C
°
M ; 0 < ° < 1; where CA is consumption of the agricultural
good and CM is consumption of a manufactures aggregate. The shape of the utility
function implies that manufactures receive a share ° of expenditure.
4One notable exception is Hau‡er and Wooton (1997) who analyze tax competition between
two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist in a world with positive
trade costs. In their paper it is shown that the large country “wins” the competition for foreign
direct investments in the sense that it attracts the foreign …rm and increases its per capita welfare
level.
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Agriculture can be costlessly traded internationally, is perfectly competitive, and
employs labor only.5 By choice of scale unit labor requirement is one, and we select
the A-good as numeraire. We consequently have
wi ¸ 1; (1)
where wi = 1 if country i produces agriculture.
The production technology in the manufacturing sector requires labor, capital,
and a composite of intermediate goods. Following Krugman and Venables (1995) we
make the simplifying assumption that the composite intermediate good is the same
as the composite consumption good, and de…ne CM ´

P
k
c
¾¡1
¾
k
¸ ¾
¾¡1
with ¾ > 1:
In line with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) we assume monopolistic competition between
intermediate good producers, and thus both the elasticity of substitution and the
perceived elasticity of demand are equal to ¾. All producers have access to the same
technology, so prices from …rms in a given country will not di¤er. Since …rms use
the constant markup ¾¾¡1 over marginal costs (MCi), the f.o.b. price from country
i is given by
pi =
¾
¾ ¡ 1
MCi: (2)
Intermediate goods are tradeable, but we assume Samuelson iceberg type trade
costs such that only 1¿ of each unit shipped actually reaches its destination. This
means that the c.i.f. price is ¿ times higher than the f.o.b. price for an imported
good. ”Trade costs” should be thought of as a synthetic measure of a wide range of
barriers to trade, and they are assumed intrinsically wasteful.
Taking the dual of CM we …nd that the true price index for the manufacturing
good is
qi =
h
nip1¡¾i + nj(pj¿)
1¡¾
i1=(1¡¾)
i 6= j; (3)
where ni and nj are the number of varieties produced on countries i and j.
5Letting agriculture not just be relatively intensive in the use of labour, but focusing on the
extreme case where it only uses labour, simpli…es the analysis signi…cantly. The qualitative results
are, however, not a¤ected.
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Let xi denote aggregate output from a representative …rm located in country
i: Labor, capital and intermediates are combined with a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Each …rm produces its output using ® units as a …xed cost and ¯ per unit output
thereafter, and a representative …rm’s total cost function is therefore
TCi = w1¡µ¡´i r
µ
i q
´
i (®+ ¯xi); µ 2 h0; 1i and ´ 2 [0;1i ; (4)
where qi is the price of the intermediates aggregate (Zi).
To simplify (but without loss of generality), we set ¯ = (¾¡1)¾ and ® =
1
¾ : There is
free entry in the manufacturing sector, and the zero pro…t condition in combination
with (4) and (2) imply that
xi =
®(¾ ¡ 1)
¯
= 1 (5)
if it is pro…table to produce intermediate goods in country i:
The supply of labor (Li) must - in equilibrium - be equal to the demand in
manufacturing (LMi) and agriculture (LAi) so Li = LMi + LAi: From (4) - using
Shephard’s lemma - we …nd
LMi = (1¡ µ ¡ ´)w
¡(µ+´)
i r
µ
i q
´
i ni: (6)
Residents can invest at home and abroad, and taxation of interest income follows
the principle of source taxation.6
Let Kii and Kij denote the part of country i’s capital which is allocated domes-
tically and abroad, respectively, so that Ki = Kii+Kij: We assume that an investor
6In principle most countries tax interest income of residents at the home tax rate, regardless of
geographic source, but allow a full credit for foreign taxes paid against the domestic tax liability
provided the foreign tax payments do not exceed the domestic tax liability. If the foreign tax
liability exceeds the domestic tax liability, foreign-source income is exempted from taxation in the
country of residence. There is, however, strong empirical evidence that governments for compliance
reasons …nd it di¢cult to tax foreign interest income (see Razin and Sadka, 1991). For this reason
interest income earned abroad either becomes untaxed or if taxed, then only subject to the foreign
tax rate. In practice, taxation of interest income therefore corresponds to the source principle of
taxation.
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who undertakes foreign direct investments incurs a de…nite loss of resources of ¿K
per unit capital exported.7 Denoting tri the tax rate on capital income in country i;
arbitrage between the home country and the foreign country implies that
(1¡ trh) rh =
³
1¡ trf
´ rf
¿K
; Khf > 0;Kfh = 0;
or (1¡ trh)
rh
¿K
=
³
1¡ trf
´
rf ; Khf = 0;Kfh > 0: (7)
From (7) it is clear that two-way investment ‡ows will never occur if trade in
capital is costly (¿K > 1) ; so Khf > 0 implies Kfh = 0 and vice versa. Without
loss of generality we shall focus on the case where country f exports and country h
imports capital. Equilibrium in the world capital market requires that the demand
for capital world-wide equals supply,
nhµw
1¡µ¡´
h r
µ¡1
h q
´
h + nfµw
1¡µ¡´
f r
µ¡1
f q
´
f = Kh +Kff +
Kfh
¿K
: (8)
Abstracting from questions related to optimal size of the public sector, we assume
that the entire tax revenue is redistributed back to consumers in equal proportions.
Disposable consumer income thus equals
Yh = whLh + rhKh + trhrh
Kfh
¿K
; Yf = wfLf + rfKff + (1¡ trh) rh
Kfh
¿K
(9)
Taxes on labor income is de facto pure lump sum, since labor supply is …xed and
internationally immobile. Capital taxes, however, a¤ect the ‡ow of capital between
the two countries and are therefore distortionary.
From the description of preferences and technology we can write the total value
of expenditure on di¤erentiated goods in each country as
Ei = °Yi + ´pini; i = h; f: (10)
7Wasteful transaction costs are common in the international macroeconomic literature and also
used in public …nance problems (e.g. Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989 and Huber, 1997). There is
moreover a substantial trade literature that analyses the e¤ect of trade barriers on factor movements
(see for instance Mundell, 1957, and Norman and Venables, 1995).
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The …rst term on the right-hand sides of (10) is residents’ expenditure on manufac-
tures while the last term is intermediate demand. Using Shepard’s lemma on (3) we
can now write that domestic and foreign demand for a good produced in country i
equals
xii = p¡¾i q
¾¡1
i Ei; xij = p
¡¾
i q
¾¡1
j ¿
1¡¾Ej; i 6= j: (11)
In equilibrium the supply of each variant must equal demand. Using (5) and
(11), the equilibrium takes the form
1 = p¡¾i
h
q¾¡1i Ei + ¿
1¡¾q¾¡1j Ej
i
; i 6= j: (12)
Balanced trade occurs when
nhphxhf ¡ nfpfxfh = (1¡ trh) rh
Kfh
¿K
¡ [whLAh ¡ (1¡ °)Yh] : (13)
Equilibrium is now characterized by the equations (1), (2), (3), 7 (8), (10), (12),
(13), which can be solved to give equilibrium values on wi, qi; pi, ri, Ei, ni and Kij;
i 6= j; i = h; f . In the next sections we investigate how changes in national capital
taxes as well as a reduction in transaction costs a¤ect spatial agglomeration.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
There will always be international wage equalization in this model if demand for
the agriculture good is so large that it must be produced in both countries. The
pure existence of an asymmetric equilibrium suggests that this outcome is somewhat
arti…cial, and the result would disappear if we had assumed that there is decreasing
returns to scale in reproducible resources (labor) in the agricultural sector. Since a
model extension along the latter lines would make the algebra substantially more
complex, we shall instead assume that ° is so large that one country is able to
produce world-wide demand for the A¡good. In that way we allow wages to di¤er
internationally in a simple model set-up. The case with enforced wage equalization
will be brie‡y discussed later in this section.
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As a point of departure we shall assume that wh > wf and that country h
is completely specialized in production of manufacturing goods and country f in
production of the agricultural good. Evidently this cannot be an equilibrium if
production of manufacturing goods in f o¤ers pure pro…ts. In the appendix it is
shown that both countries produce M-goods unless
x¤f =
0
@ 1¡ t
r
h³
1¡ trf
´
¿K
1
A
¡µ¾
w¾(1¡µ¡´)h ¿
1¡¾¡´¾
"
1 +
Ef
Ef +Eh
³
¿ 2(¾¡1) ¡ 1
´#
< 1: (14)
It is convenient to assume that trh = trf in order to get an intuitive feeling for the
relationship between x¤f and ¿ : Note …rst that international location is irrelevant if
there is completely free trade, in which case we necessarily must have x¤f > xh = 1
if wh > wf : An outcome with international wage di¤erences and complete special-
ization consequently cannot be an equilibrium at ¿ = 1:0: Neither can it be an
equilibrium in the neighborhood of ¿ = 1:0; since x¤f is a continuous function of ¿ :
What if ¿ increases from a ”high value”? Then x¤f must also increase, and a pos-
sible specialized equilibrium eventually break down, since the countries approaches
autarky. For some medium levels of trade costs, however, a completely specialized
equilibrium with wh > wf may exist if some of the industry output also is used as
inputs (´ > 0). The reason is that country h then o¤ers both a relatively large mar-
ket for manufacturing goods (demand linkage) and inexpensive intermediate goods
to the industry (cost linkage); qh < qf : These cost and demand linkages (so called
positive market linkages) may dominate over the fact that wh > wf : We should thus
expect x¤f to be a U-shaped function of ¿ , and this is con…rmed by the simulations
in the next section.8
In the next two subsections we shall investigate how changes in national tax
rates
³
trh; trf
´
and capital mobility (¿K) a¤ect the sustainability of a manufacturing
agglomeration located in h, national industrial structures and welfare. At the same
time we moreover elaborate on optimal tax policy in the presence of industrial
agglomerations. Note that entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector generally are
8This is a quite common result in economic geography models, and was …rst shown by Krugman
and Venables (1995). See also Ottaviano and Puga (1997) for a survey.
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challenged on two fronts; they must compete for market shares with possible foreign
…rms in the same industry and with (potential) domestic agriculture production for
labor. These general equilibrium e¤ects makes it necessary to rely on simulations.
3.1 Tax Policy
The international location of economic activity depends in general on relative market
sizes, market linkages, trade costs, national tax policies, and the degree of capital
mobility.9
It is easy to show that increased capital taxation in f reinforces the manufac-
turing agglomeration in h and reduces the pro…tability of producing manufacturing
goods in f; so that we have
@x¤f
@trf
< 0: The reason for this rather obvious result is
that the potential net return on capital investments decreases when capital taxes
increase. We shall refer to this e¤ect as the rate of return e¤ect.
The impact on agglomeration in h from an increase in trh is less transparent, and
it can be shown that
@x¤f
@trh
has an ambiguous sign because there are two opposing
e¤ects that must be considered. The …rst is the rate of return e¤ect which - as
indicated above - now will weaken agglomeration in h. The second e¤ect is the
income e¤ect. Since country h is a net-importer of capital, an increase in trh tends
to raise tax revenue and thus national income in h. The increase in national income
in turn raises demand in h and therefore the pro…tability of manufacturing in h.
Which e¤ect that dominates, the rate of return or the income e¤ect, depends on
the relative magnitude of the two e¤ects. Yet, for a more or less realistic choice of
parameter values, the former is found to dominate, implying that an increase in the
home country’s tax rate weakens the forces for agglomerations.
More important than the ambiguity of the sign of
@x¤f
@trh
is the fact that it may be
optimal for country h to increase capital taxation even if
@x¤f
@trh
> 0: This is illustrated
in …gure 1, which shows x¤f as a function of ¿ for three di¤erent tax constellations.
For the middle curve capital taxes are zero in both countries
n
trh = 0:0; trf = 0:0
o
,
9The assumption of imperfect capital mobility has been supported by empirical studies. See
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987).
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while
n
trh = 0:2; trf = 0:0
o
and
n
trh = 0:0; trf = 0:2
o
for the upper and lower curve;
respectively.10 Consider now the middle curve and the parameter values trh = trf =
0:0; and ¿ = 1:3; yielding x¤f ¼ 0; 7. Since tax revenues from foreign capital owners
are increasing in trh as long as x¤f stays below 1.0, it is clear from the middle curve
that country h could gain from increasing its capital tax rate. This is illustrated by
considering the upper curve where country h levies a 20% tax on capital without
losing any …rms. The upper …gure actually tells us that there is no reason why the
home country should set trh lower than some twenty percent when ¿ = 1:3.11
FIGURE 1: Sustainability of an industrial agglomeration.
Positive market linkages generate cost and demand advantages which may dom-
inate over the disadvantage incurred by a relatively higher wage rate in country h,
making the …rms located in h more competitive than any potential …rm in f . Thus,
the stronger the linkages within the industry (measured by ´); the stronger the forces
for agglomeration and, consequently, the deeper the U-curves. In the presence of
such linkages and positive trade costs, the proximity to other …rms is essential for
the competitiveness of a manufacturer - a fact that may be exploited by the gov-
ernment of a host country by levying relatively high taxes. The U-shape of x¤f(¿)
makes it clear, however, that country h’s ability to tax foreign capitalists depends
10See appendix for other parameter values.
11Though international tax agreements may prevent countries from direct capital subsidies, there
are usually no upward limits on the allowed tax rates.
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crucially on the level of trade costs (i.e., the degree of economic integration). In
particular, the import competition facing a potential entrepreneur in f is low when
trade costs are high. He is consequently able to charge relatively high prices from
domestic consumers, with a correspondingly high value on the marginal product of
capital. This increases the tax elasticity of the cluster, which is also happens for
low levels of trade costs, since …rms then are sensitive to di¤erences in wage costs
and tax rates between the home and foreign country. Indeed, …gure 1 shows that
the cluster will dissolve when trade costs fall below the critical level ¿ < 1:15 unless
h has lower capital taxation than f (c.f. middle curve where ¿ < 1:15 yields x¤f > 1).
To understand this result recall that the model allows for positive market linkages
(´ > 0) ; and within the chosen framework of imperfect competition such linkages
generate pecuniary externalities . Pecuniary externalities may encourage industrial
agglomeration, but only as long as there are trade costs, since geographical distance
does not matter per se for pecuniary externalities (unlike what often is assumed for
technological externalities, see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Bayoumi, Coe
and Helpman, 1996, and Ja¤e, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993).12 When trade
costs fall below a certain level, cost di¤erences encouraging the spread of industry
come to dominate.
Country size or, more precisely, local purchasing power is also important for
the host country’s taxing ability (due to the scale advantages in the manufacturing
sector). Country size in this model may be measured in terms of factor endow-
ments, and is re‡ected through consumers’ expenditures on manufactured products
(Eh; Ef ): A small country is placed at a disadvantage relative to the larger country
due to its inferior market access. From (14) it can be derived that the smaller the
country where manufacturing is concentrated, the more sensitive is an industrial
cluster to changes. Decreasing size of the host country means that the U is pulled
upwards
µ
dx¤f
dEh
> 0
¶
. Thus, if a small country is hosting the agglomeration, rela-
tively small changes in tax policy may destabilize the asymmetric equilibrium. This
result is qualitatively in line with Hau‡er and Wooton (1997). The policy variables
12The cluster would have remained all down to ¿ = 1:0 if trf = t
r
h and we had chosen parameter
values such that we always have wage equalization, c.f. the discussion above.
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in their model are trade costs and lump sum taxes, and they …nd that the small
country levies lower taxes in the locational equilibrium than does the large country.
Eventually, production technology also has implications for the consequences of
tax reforms: the higher the share of capital in the production cost of the manufac-
turing good, the more severe the e¤ects of changes in tax policy. It can be derived
from equation (14) that the more capital intensive is manufacturing, the more cru-
cial is the rental rate of capital - and thereby the tax rate of capital - for a …rm’s
location decision.
Summarising our …ndings, it appears that the stronger the forces for agglom-
eration, the higher the tax on capital income that the home government can levy
without fearing the vanishing of the industrial agglomeration. The forces for ag-
glomeration are stronger the larger the size of the home market, the smaller the
foreign market, the more signi…cant the intra-industry linkages, and are most domi-
nant for intermediate levels of trade costs. This can alternatively be illustrated in a
diagram where we let x¤f be drawn as a function of the tax rate in the home country,
for given values of all other parameters. The optimal tax rate from a home country
point of view, is the maximum tax rate that can be charged without the industrial
agglomeration dissolving, and is given by trh = 0:48 for which x¤f = 1: For stronger
(weaker) forces for agglomeration the x¤f curve shifts to the right (left), implying
that the optimal and maximum tax rate increases (decreases).
FIGURE 2: Optimal tax rate in the presence of an industrial agglomeration.
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Figures 1 and 2 elucidate the important result that for a certain range of param-
eter values, despite being perfectly internationally mobile, capital may be perfectly
inelastic in supply. For all parameter values that gives x¤f < 1, capital will be inelas-
tic in supply to manufacturing activity taking place within the industrial cluster. It
will not respond to any changes in tax rates or trade costs as long as these does not
entail that the crictical x¤f = 1 is exceeded.
3.2 Capital mobility
Transaction costs on capital are intrinsically wasteful and reduce the rate of return
by
³
1¡ 1¿K
´
percent for each exported capital unit, other things being equal. What
happens if the transaction costs on capital are reduced? First, it raises the returns
to exported capital, making exporting of capital more pro…table and strengthens
the agglomeration in h. Second, capital revenues in both countries are a¤ected. As
a …rst guess it is tempting to state that the capital exporting country (f) will be
better o¤ if ¿K is reduced, but that is not necessarily true. This is easily seen by
looking at the change in the capital revenue for f when transaction costs are reduced
(¡d¿K > 0) ; by de…ning Rf ´
rhKfh
¿K
= rhKf¿K and di¤erentiating w.r.t. ¿K we …nd
dRf
¡d¿K
=
rhKf
¿2K
¡
Kf
¿K
drh
d¿K
: (15)
The …rst term on the right hand side of (15) shows the e¤ect on f ’s capital income
when we hold rh …xed. This is the direct e¤ect of reduced transaction costs and
is obviously positive. Since there is decreasing returns to capital, and the e¤ective
capital stock increases when ¿K is reduced, we must, however, subtract the second
term. The existence of two opposing terms means that in general Rf will not reach
its maximum value at ¿K = 1:13 Whether one or the other e¤ect dominates depends
crucially on how transaction costs are modelled and on the production function in
the manufacturing sector. In general one would expect the in‡uence of the positive
e¤ect to be stronger the higher the substitutability between capital and the other
13Reduced transaction costs would always be bene…cial for f if capital owners in f could coor-
dinate their export decisions, in which case they would use their market power and withhold some
of the capital (Rf is maximized for some Kfh < Kf):
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factors of production. As for capital revenue in h, this will decrease due to the lower
rate of return to capital.
A higher degree of capital mobility implies that the agglomeration in h, ceteris
paribus, is weakened if dRf¡d¿K > 0, because local demand in f increases and local
demand in h decreases, i.e. production in f becomes more pro…table. However,
there are also e¤ects present that are not included in (15): If capital income in f
increases, so do tax revenues in h:This strengthens agglomeration in h. Furthermore,
an increased capital stock not only implies a reduced price on capital, but also allows
for more varieties to be produced. Reduced price on capital and more varieties entail
lower prices and price indices, and increased real income in both countries.
Hence, the total e¤ect on agglomeration in h from a reduction in ¿K is ambiguous.
With our speci…cations, however, the likely scenario is one where agglomeration in h
is reinforced and welfare is increased in both countries. It should, however, be noted
that agglomeration cannot be sustainable if ¿K is su¢ciently increased. Therefore
tighter restrictions on capital mobility may enforce the spread of economic activities
internationally. Whether or not such a policy is welfare improving for country f
depends in general on the level of trade costs as well as the characteristics of the
production technology and the extent of pecuniary externalities (see Kind, Midelfart
Knarvik and Schjelderup 1997).
3.3 Related literature
Our discussion of capital mobility and tax policy relates to various strands in the re-
cent literature on the interaction between capital mobility and tax policy. A central
result here is that a country which faces a perfectly internationally mobile capital
should not use source-based taxes on capital income. This result hinges on the
assumptions that the government can tax labor optimally, that labor is internation-
ally immobile (its supply …xed), that there are no pure pro…ts, that trade in goods
between countries does not occur [Gordon (1986), Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991)
and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)], and that when capital is perfectly internation-
ally mobile, it is also perfectly elastic in supply. The intuition is that internationally
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mobile capital escapes any tax burden if foreign source income cannot be taxed and
the country is small. Thus, a source-based capital income tax is fully shifted to im-
mobile factors. It is well understood that this result is a generalized open economy
version of Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) production e¢ciency theorem.
Our results obtained in section 3.1 were derived under the assumption of zero
transaction costs on internationally mobile capital and are therefore comparable to
this literature. Our …ndings, however, show that when one allows for pecuniary
externalities and trade in goods the result of a zero source tax on capital is no
longer valid (c.f. section 3.1). As a matter of fact, a country may bene…t from
levying a source tax on capital income if it is the host of an industrial cluster. The
reason is the inclusion of trade, trade costs and market linkages in our model. In
particular, their inclusion means that manufacturers in the ”cluster location” h are
more competitive than their ”rivals” in f , and can thus pay a higher price for each
unit of capital without making losses. So even if capital can move costlessly between
countries, the supply of capital will not be perfectly tax elastic, in fact for a range of
trade costs, tax rates and other parameter values, it will in fact be inelastic in supply
to an established industrial agglomeration. This is the main reason why previous
results in the tax literature no longer are valid in this model.14
A di¤erent type of results have been obtained in the literature that examines
the welfare impact of quantitative capital controls [Giovannini (1991), Razin and
Sadka (1991), Huber (1997) and Bjerksund and Schjelderup (1998)]. These studies
can be compared to the scenario in our model when ¿K > 1: Giovannini (1991) and
Razin and Sadka (1991) …nd that if governments cannot tax foreign-source income,
it is optimal from an e¢ciency point of view to impose quantitative restrictions on
capital exports in combination with a positive source tax on capital. The reason
is that reducing capital exports increases the capital income tax base and allows a
welfare increasing reduction in the tax on capital income for a given level of public
consumption.
14Note that our result also holds in the absence of market linkages, as long as there are di¤erences
in market size. If h constitute the larger country where the complete monopolistic industry is
localised, the country may still bene…t from levying a source tax on capital income.
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Huber (1997) modi…es the result by Giovannini (1991), Razin and Sadka (1991)
by studying a speci…c type of capital controls which act like proportional transaction
costs that increase the cost of international capital movements. Huber shows that
the optimal policy for a capital exporting country depends on the revenue needs of
the government. For relatively low levels of government expenditures, for example,
the optimal policy entails a binding quota on capital exports but a zero source-tax on
capital. This result is qualitatively similar to Gordon (1986) (see above), and hinges
on the governments ability to tax the rent accruing to the inelastic factor labor at
a rate of 100%. If these rents cannot be fully taxed, a zero source-based capital
income tax is no longer necessarily optimal (see Giovannini (1991)). Bjerksund and
Schjelderup (1998) consider restrictions on capital exports if agents di¤er in their
shares of capital and labor income and labor supply is variable. Their analysis shows
that irrespective of distributional preferences, free capital mobility is never optimal
if capital is taxed according to the source principle of taxation. In addition, it is
always optimal for a government to levy a positive source-tax on capital income.
These results are obtained for any government objective, because the incidence of
the wage tax is partly shifted to capital owners.
Our analysis supports this literature in the sense that it may be optimal from a
social standing point to restrict the free mobility of capital. However, the reasons
for this di¤er from the other studies. As discussed in section 3.2, tighter restrictions
on capital mobility may enforce the spread of economic activities internationally.
This may be optimal from a national point of view depending on the level of trade
costs as well as the characteristics of the production technology and the extent of
pecuniary externalities. Our analysis, therefore, provides additional reasons for why
capital mobility may not be optimal from a single country’s point of view.
4 Concluding Remarks
Models with imperfect competition and intra-industry trade have become widely
accepted as appropriate frameworks within which to analyze the impact of trade
liberalization on industrial agglomeration. The research outlined in this paper is
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novel in the sense that it makes one modi…cation to the standard model; it allows for
capital taxation of internationally mobile capital. Making this change fundamentally
changes previous results and recommendations from the tax literature on capital
taxation and capital mobility (i.e., countries should not levy source taxes on capital,
see Gordon 1986, Frenkel, Razin and Sadka 1991 and Huber 1997). In particular, one
of the main lessons from the analysis is that a country which hosts agglomeration of
manufacturing may actually increase its welfare level per capita by levying a tax on
capital income. This results carries through if a tax increase leads to an expansion
in demand in the host country that is su¢ciently high to compensate capital owners
for the direct loss in capital income following the tax change.
The fact that levying a source tax on capital may be welfare increasing was shown
to depend on the level of trade costs and the existence of positive market linkages.
This means that including trade into the framework of capital taxation is important
partly because the existence of both trade costs and linkages are well documented,
and partly because these factors seem to matter for the design of policy.
5 Appendix
In this section we give the parameterized values of …gure 1 as well as the derivation
of equation (14).
5.1 Parameter values for …gure 1:
The derivation of …gure 1 is based on the following parameter values:
Lh = 1; Lf = 2; Kh = 1; Kf = 2; ¾ = 4:0; µ = 0:4; ´ = 0:4; ° = 0:9; and free
mobility of capital, that is, ¿K = 1:0: The same parameter values are employed for
…gure 2 where in addition tf = 0:2.
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5.2 The condition for a sustainable asymmetric equilibrium
with industrial agglomeration:
From (3) we have that qf = ¿qh = ¿n
1
1¡¾
h ph if all manufacturing is located in country
h (i.e., nf = 0). Using (5) and (12) we …nd that the sales of a manufacturing …rm
in h equals:
xh =
Eh +Ef
phnh
= 1: (16)
Now consider an entrepreneur in f . Since the elasticity of substitution between
any two intermediate goods equals ¾; he would expect to sell
³
pf
ph¿
´¡¾ ³ Ef
phnh¿
´
in f
and ¿
³
pf ¿
ph
´¡¾ Ef
phnh
in h (recall that only 1¿ of each good actually reaches the export
destination since we have assumed Samuelson iceberg costs). We thus …nd
x¤f =
Ã
pf
ph
!¡¾ "¿¾¡1Ef + ¿ 1¡¾Eh
phnh
#
; (17)
and that it is unpro…table to produce manufacturing goods in f if x¤f < 1:
Equation (17) can alternatively be expressed as
x¤f =
0
@ 1¡ t
r
h³
1¡ trf
´
¿K
1
A
¡µ¾
w¾(1¡µ¡´)h ¿
1¡¾¡´¾
"
1 +
Ef
Ef +Eh
³
¿2(¾¡1) ¡ 1
´#
(18)
by using that wf = 1; pf = rµfq
´
f , ph = w
1¡µ¡´
h rµhq
´
h (c.f. equations (4) and (2)),
qf = ¿qh; and the no-arbitrage condition
rf
rh
= 1¡t
r
h
(1¡trf)¿K
from equation (7).
Finally, labor in h receives a share (1¡ µ ¡ ´) of expenditures on manufacturing
goods (c.f. 3) if there is complete international specialization, so that we have
whLh = (1¡ µ ¡ ´) (Eh +Ef) ; (19)
or
whLh = phnhxh = phnh: (20)
Solving the system of equations (10), (13), (18), (19), and (20) we obtain equi-
librium values for the variables wh; rh; Eh;Ef ; Eh +Ef , and can express x¤f in terms
of parameters only;
x¤h =
0
@ 1¡ t
r
h³
1¡ trf
´
¿K
1
A
¡µ¾ Ã
° (1¡ µ ¡ ´)Lf
(1¡ °) (1¡ ´)Lh
!¾(1¡µ¡´)
¿¡´¾ (21)
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¢2
41 +
0
@(1¡ °) (1¡ ´) +
(1¡ trh) µ
Kf
¿K
Kf
¿K
+Kh
1
A
³
¿ 2(¾¡1) ¡ 1
´
3
5 < 1 :
It is now straightforward to di¤erentiate x¤f with respect to, e.g., trh and trf ; and
…nd the e¤ects discussed in the main text.
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